Private companies fight piracy

Parleying with pirates, and then paying the ransom (often by airdrops), are jobs that shipowners regularly contract out to private firms or “risk consultancies”. Other maritime security services are less controversial: fitting ships with kit, such as barbed or electric wires, to make it hard for pirates to clamber aboard. Increasingly, security firms also put armed guards on ships, or offer their own craft as escorts.

Business protecting ships off east Africa has tripled in the past year, says Eos Risk Management, a London firm that says it has fended off at least 15 attacks from Somali pirates since January. Eos usually uses non-lethal defences, but David Johnson, its boss, says new players are rushing into maritime security, taking advantage of the ample supply of weapons in Africa.

Armed escort ships, offering protection for a price, are becoming a lot more common off east Africa. Local coastguards, where they exist, have got used to private-security vessels plying their waters, says Stan Ayscue of Securewest International, a firm based in Singapore and Virginia.

Draconian force is seldom necessary, adds Mr Berra. Attackers often give up when 12.7mm machineguns are fired into the water, creating a big splash. The head of another European security firm says many outfits sidestep bans on weapons in port by tossing them overboard.Yet a show of firepower is increasingly necessary because pirates are getting blasé about “non-lethal” defences like water hoses and sonic blasts, says David Schewitz, whose California-based company, RSB International , helps protect ships.

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Wealthy arm their yachts with military-level security

LONDON, England (CNN) -- The world's richest people are spending millions arming their super-yachts with military-style technology and trained personnel to fight off potential attackers.

The threat of pirates and growing fears that yachts may be their next target have led many owners to equip their vessels with the latest James Bond-like technology.

Hidden chambers, escape pods, tracking devices and ex-marines employed as security guards have all risen in popularity.

"It is only a matter of time before pirates move from cargo ships to attacking super-yachts cruising near Somalia," Michael Howorth, former super-yacht captain and technical editor at SuperYachtWorld magazine, told CNN.

"Many pirates do not yet appreciate the importance and potential value of these yachts."

Howorth and other experts also believe piracy is no longer an issue confined to the Gulf of Aden -- the waters off the Somalian coast where most recent incidents have taken place.

For more go to CNN

IRAN SENDS TWO WARSHIP TO CONFRONT SOMALI PIRATES

Iran has sent two warships to the Gulf of Aden to protect oil tankers and other vessels from the world’s fifth-largest crude exporter against attacks by pirates off the coast of Somalia, state radio said on Thursday. Pirate attacks, fuelled by large ransoms, have continued almost unabated despite the presence of an armada of foreign warships patrolling the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.
In January, pirates released an Iranian-chartered cargo ship carrying 36,000 tonnes of wheat to Iran from Germany that was seized in November. In March, a regional maritime official said Somali villagers had detained another Iranian vessel. “The mission of these warships is to protect Iranian merchant ships and oil tankers against pirate attacks,” state radio said.They would arrive in the Gulf of Aden in the next two days and stay there for five months, state television said.
Iran said in December it had dispatched a warship to the same waters, but Thursday’s reports did not say whether it was still there. Nearly 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year, heading to and from the Suez Canal. Seven percent of world oil consumption passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2007, according to Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit. Analysts say the only way to stop bandits on the high seas is to resolve Somalia’s political crisis on land where pirates profit from lawlessness as Islamist-led rebels fight government troops and African Union peacekeepers.
SOURCED FROM REUTERS

Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea

Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing inter est in using small boats to attack military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities. The tactics and techniques of using commercial or non-commercial vessels (under 500 tons) or swimmers to emplace or deliver improvised explosive devices have proven effective and exportable. Contemporary operational practices by transnational terrorist groups include refining proven attack methods, sharing lessons learned, and encouraging others to adopt effective tactics. Thus, the possibility of such attacks in U.S. waters should not be ignored.

The small-boat threat needs to be addressed, but rather than focusing on this particular terrorist tactic, Congress and the Administration should invest in assets that improve the overall security of the maritime domain. The maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats. Efforts should be expanded to improve U.S. situational awareness and law enforcement response rather than fixating on specific attack scenarios involving small boats or other terrorist threats.

The Small-Boat Threat

The definition of "small-boat threat" encompasses a variety of possible weapon-delivery vehicles, tactics, and payloads. Vessels include everything from large craft such as small freighters, large privately owned yachts, fishing trawlers, and commercial tugs to din ghies, jet-skies, and submarines, including mini-sub marines like those used by the Japanese in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

An attack could involve suicide bombers, as in the case of the attack on the USS Cole, or vessels on autopilot or remotely controlled. Improvised explosive devices could be delivered or emplaced by boats or swimmers (assisted or unassisted by breathing devices). This could involve placing a "parasite" on the hull of a craft or deploying teth ered (anchored to the sea bottom) or untethered (floating) mines in a sea lane, waterway, or port traffic area.

Besides conventional explosives, the bombers could detonate nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological devices. Attacks could occur while the targeted ship is docked at shore, approaching a port, sailing in international waters, or in U.S. or Canadian coastal waterways. In addition to ships, attacks could target port facilities; commercial infra structure (e.g., an entertainment pier, bridge piling, or pipeline); or public events.

How Small-Boat Attacks Are Carried Out

In many respects, small-boat threats resemble other terrorist plots and have a similar signature. They require recruiting, training and planning, sur veillance and intelligence collection, operational security, logistical support, rehearsals, information operations, and execution.

On the other hand, these threats have some unique characteristics and considerations. They can require unique attributes and knowledge such as maritime skills (e.g., sailing and scuba diving); familiarity with the target area (such as traffic pat terns near a port facility); or explosives training. Unique environmental concerns that can affect the planning and conduct of maritime attacks include weather, tides, and other variables that could affect the dependability and reliability of the strike method. For example, salt, water, and wind can adversely affect weapons delivery and detonation.

Terrorists like predictability. They like to know the obstacles that they will face and the probable results of an attack. Uncertainties in the maritime domain could significantly affect the desirability of employing the small-boat attack method. For exam ple, large public events like a "tall ship" week or a national sporting event might seem inviting targets because of the large crowds of people and the public attention focused on the events. However, large, one-time events are less promising targets because of the additional security and the greater difficulty in predicting the security conditions.

Often, strikes on public venues are more appeal ing to "lone wolf" attackers who might not weigh the risks and benefits of less well-planned opera tions as carefully. Likewise, targets such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers or other ships carrying hazardous materials might seem to present tempt ing opportunities to generate spectacular cata strophic affects. However, from material on the Internet, terrorists already know of the debate over whether or not a small-boat attack could realistically achieve a catastrophic outcome.

On the other hand, normal commercial traffic and port operations bear many of the same charac teristics of a desirable terrorist target, including lim ited responsive security and highly predictable patterns of behavior. For example, high-value ships such as cruise ships and tankers carrying extremely hazardous materials are much more vulnerable when entering or leaving restricted navigable waters along the U.S. coastline, in port areas, or along domestic waterways. During these periods, a large ship typically has a pilot on board, is moving at a low speed, and is following a tight and predictable course because of underwater obstructions and maritime traffic.

Previous al-Qaeda Small-Boat Attacks

The most prominent small-boat attack on a mil itary ship occurred on October 12, 2000, when al-Qaeda operatives detonated a small boat filled with explosives against the hull of the USS Cole, which was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The attack killed 17 U.S. sailors and wounded 39 oth ers. It also garnered much publicity for al-Qaeda, which subsequently highlighted the attack in its recruiting videos and other propaganda.

In October 2002, al-Qaeda undertook its first successful attack against a commercial ship using a small boat. Its operatives rammed the French super tanker Limburg with a small fishing craft packed with explosives. The attack, which occurred while the Limburg was 12 miles off the coast of Yemen, killed one crew member, injured 12 others, and caused a spill of 50,000 barrels of crude oil along 45 miles of coastline.

Other terrorist groups besides al-Qaeda have attempted to use small boats as weapons-delivery vehicles. On November 7, 2000, a Hamas suicide bomber aboard a fishing boat tried to attack an Israeli patrol craft sailing off the Gaza Strip. Alert crew members detected the threat and sank the boat before the Hamas operative could consummate the attack. The Tamil Tigers have also attempted a num ber of improvised maritime attacks in Sri Lanka.

In addition to terrorist threats, transnational criminals have used similar tactics to smuggle drugs, weapons, humans, and other contraband. These include everything from building mini-sub marines to smuggle drugs across the Gulf of Mexico to trafficking Cuban refugees to Key West. Many of the operational practices employed by transnational criminals are adaptable to terrorist attacks. (Con­versely, countermeasures designed to address small-boat threats might also be valuable in combating illicit trafficking by small boats.)

How Serious Is the Threat?

The risks associated with small-boat threats are complex. An assessment of risk combines an evalu ation of criticality (or consequences), threat, and vulnerability. Three major risks connected with small-boat threats should be considered.

The Psychological Impact. Research data make a compelling case that "man-made malicious" events create more fear, apprehension, and uncertainty than natural disasters or accidents. Almost every week, the U.S. experiences maritime incidents that are equivalent to a small-scale terrorist attack in terms of endangering life and property. These range from boating episodes involving individuals to com mercial industrial accidents that put hundreds of lives and millions of dollars of infrastructure at risk.

The United States has also experienced a number of large-scale maritime disruptions, which have affected thousands to tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage. These include everything from the Texas City (1947) and San Francisco (1944) disasters, which involved large commercial ships carrying extremely hazard ous materials, to Hurricane Katrina, which crippled the ports of New Orleans and Mobile. A terrorist attack of similar scale would certainly have a signif icantly greater impact on the public, particularly because many Americans have only a minimal appreciation of what occurs in the maritime domain. Anxiety is always greater when individuals are less familiar with the situation.

The impact of a terrorist attack might be reflected in many different behaviors and attitudes, from undermining the confidence of Americans in their government to panic buying because of the fear of economic disruption. The scale and duration of psychological damage could vary significantly, depending on the nature of the incident and the character of the response.

Physical Destruction.A small-boat attack is unlikely to cause a large loss of life or property unless it involves a weapon of mass destruction or highly hazardous material that causes a large-scale fire or explosion. Even a large-scale disaster involv ing thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage is unlikely to have long-term negative con sequences for the U.S. economy.

In many respects, the response required in the event of a small-boat attack would resemble the response to a fire, explosion, or industrial accident. Thus, many of the current safety measures, equip ment, drills, and training required for maritime safety would be applicable to reducing the loss of life and property in the event of a small-boat attack. Likewise, any measures to improve overall safety, firefighting assets, all-hazards disaster response capabilities, search and rescue, other emergency ser vices, and salvage and recovery would contribute to reducing damage in the event of a successful attack.

Disruption of Services.Much of the U.S. mari time infrastructure is clustered near urban centers. Thus, attacks might disrupt mass transit, interrupt delivery of goods and services, or require the evac uation of local populations. Some attacks might seek to disable larger vessels to block waterways, bridges, or tunnels. Physical disruptions would likely be highly localized and have little impact on the overall economy or long-term economic growth, even in the case of large-scale disasters.

Near-term economic impact might be more sig nificant and widespread if terrorists conducted mul tiple attacks at multiple locations or if the attack affected the national supply chain. Government (U.S., Canadian, or Mexican) and/or private-sector responses after a strike (such as closing ports of entry) might be more likely to have a significant economic impact than would the direct results of the physical destruction caused by the attack itself.

On the other hand, individual companies or industries might suffer long-term negative affects, such as the cruise industry if a cruise ship were attacked. This might be reflected in increased insur ance rates or loss of customer confidence.

The Scope of the Challenge

The small-boat problem is complicated by the magnitude of areas and activities encompassing small-boat activity; the lack of situational awareness by federal, state, and local authorities; and the lim ited capacity to interdict active threats.

Policing a Vast Domain. Small boats operate on thousands of miles of U.S. coastline, inland water ways, and lakes. Frequent undeclared entries by small boats occur between the U.S. and Canada and between the U.S. and the Bahamas every day. On any given day, the number of small craft in U.S. waters is vast. Thousands of boats are bought and sold every year, and many small boats are operated with minimal training or licensing requirements. In many areas, small boats operate in proximity to high-value ships and maritime infrastructure with out restriction.

Situational Awareness. The requirement for sit uational awareness in U.S. ports, coastal areas, and waterways evolved primarily in response to the need for aids to navigation and safety. Situational awareness to support physical security and law enforcement activities was not a primary concern.

Post-9/11 situational awareness has been en hanced by adapting existing technologies, such as surface radars in some ports, and by applying new technologies, such as infrared video surveillance and GPS. Few of these capabilities have been or can be applied practically to the monitoring of small-boat activities, although there are some on going initiatives. For example, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center has experi mented with employing Navy sonobouys to detect small boats in high-density smuggling areas, but implementing such solutions has major technical and cost implications.

Interdiction and Response. Local, state, and federal law enforcement have limited capability to detect threats, and standoff detection is usually restricted to meters at best. For example, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and some local law enforcement authorities have the capability to scan the hulls of boats for parasites. Current detection capabilities are a mix of intrusive and non-intrusive systems. Almost of all of them are time-consuming and costly, and almost all of them present significant "false negatives" and "false positives" problems in attempting to identify threats.

Law enforcement at all levels also has very lim ited capacity to disable small craft or swimmers and ineffective response times in meeting unanticipated threats. Methods of incapacitation mostly involve the use of potentially lethal force. Rules for the employment of lethal force are not consistent across government agencies. In addition, methods for dis abling small boats using non-lethal technologies are neither widely available nor particularly effective.

Only the U.S. Navy has any notable capacity to detect and clear mines and improvised explosive devices at sea or in waterways. No dedicated domestic assets can address waterborne mines. The U.S. navy has conducted some research and has developed some capability to detect and interdict swimmers, but this capacity is not widely available for U.S. ports or waterways. Any application of additional technologies or capabilities for interdic tion and response has significant cost and technical implications.

Ensuring Economic Competitiveness.Moving people, goods, and services by sea and waterway is extremely cost-effective. In addition, waterborne traffic, while not without environmental conse­quences, produces much less air pollution than does moving goods by truck. A significant expan sion of domestic maritime traffic for the transporta tion of goods and people could give the United States a key economic competitive advantage in the 21st century. Smaller craft could play a critical role in this economic expansion. The key challenge to exploiting this potential advantage will be public and private investment in maritime infrastructure.

Currently, the nation as a whole does a poor job of investing in maritime infrastructure. Federal and state laws do not provide adequate incentives and in some cases discourage investment. In regard to security, this provides a dual challenge to policy makers. On the one hand, further excessive regula tion and restrictions in the name of enhancing security will only further discourage investment. On the other hand, as the nation increasingly exploits its ability to move by sea, maritime infra structure will become even more critical to the economy, and concerns over its security will become even more pressing.

The U.S. Response

Post-9/11 security initiatives have only margin ally improved the U.S. capacity to deal with the small-boat threat. The recently adopted Interna tional Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the correspond ing requirements in the U.S. Maritime Transporta tion Security Act address small-boat threats only incidentally by requiring vulnerability assessments, security plans, and security coordinators.

U.S. law requires ships over 500 tons to provide 96 hours notice to the U.S. Coast Guard before entering U.S. waters. This requirement does not address the small-boat threat.

Following the attack on the Cole, the U.S. Navy and many of its foreign counterparts substantially improved their force protection procedures. These better military defenses mean that terrorists in the future will more likely choose to attack softer targets such as commercial vessels flagged in the U.S. or friendly countries.

Since 9/11, security has received increased em phasis in U.S. ports and waterways, including more coordination among federal, state, and local entities; greater access control; and added security measures. Some security measures have been introduced spe­cifically to address the small-boat threat. For exam ple, LNG tankers are escorted into port and guarded, although other more vulnerable and volatile hazard ous cargo is often not given the same attention. While in port, cruise ships are required to post a picket craft to warn off or interdict small boats.

Some ports have established operational coordi nation or information sharing centers, such as Operation Seahawk in Charleston, South Carolina. Typically, these centers do not focus on the small-boat threat, although some coordinate reports of suspicious activity or investigations that might uncover such a threat.

While there have also been some efforts to increase and coordinate police, county sheriff, state game and wildlife, and U.S. Coast Guard water borne patrolling, these programs are modest. In some cases, volunteer groups such as state maritime defense forces have been used to supplement water borne patrolling.

Development of the national maritime security strategy and the Maritime Operations Threat Response Plan has improved maritime security coordination overall, but it does not address the small-boat threat specifically.

There have been some marginal efforts to coordi nate research and development of technologies and techniques and tactics among the Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Laboratories, federally funded research and development centers (such as RAND and the Homeland Security Institute), and other federal and private-sector entities. However, many disparate pilot projects, experiments, and ongoing initiatives are poorly coordinated and lack a clear plan to operationalize the research results.

In June 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard plans to con vene a major conference of maritime stakeholders to propose new measures for dealing with the small-boat threat. The recommendations will likely include a combination of new regulatory require ments and sharing best practices.

Possible Countermeasures

Countermeasures generally fall into one of three categories, and each set of solutions faces significant challenges.

Identification and Accreditation. These mea sures include proposals for new regulatory regimes requiring additional stipulations for licensing indi vidual operators and craft; national standardization of licensing processes and documents (including both the licenses themselves and "breeder" docu ments such as the documents used to verify identity and legal status); reporting of lost and stolen licenses and craft; and requirements for transpon­ders, which would enable authorities to identify and track small boats.

These proposals raise significant cost and effec tiveness issues that need to be addressed, as well as significant issues concerning cost-sharing and responsibility among federal, state, and local enti ties. Identification and accreditation regimes will also raise privacy concerns similar to those involved in implementing REAL ID. Further regulation of the maritime transport, boating, and recreation indus­tries could have negative economic impacts.

Another challenge is identifying and accrediting the many small boats in U.S. waters that come from outside the United States, particularly from Canada and the Bahamas and/or that are registered overseas and licensed under flags of convenience. One set of proposals would extend the 96-hour notification requirement to all ships (even those under 500 tons) entering U.S. waters.

Yet proposals to extend notification requirements to small boats raise a number of concerns. For exam ple, many small boats can travel to U.S. waters in less than 96 hours (e.g., from Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas). Small-boat owners are concerned about the cost and inconvenience of complying with such regulations. In addition, such reporting would gen erate mounds of data, and screening and evaluating those data for useful information poses significant cost and human capital challenges.

Finally, identification and accreditation programs are effective when combined with capabilities to investigate fraud, identify and respond to suspicious activities and persons, and prosecute violators.

Improving Situational Awareness and Detect ing Threats. These measures could involve a range of activities from "neighborhood watch" and public awareness programs to technologies that provide wide-area surveillance and standoff detection of explosives and materials used in weapons of mass destruction.

Identifying and monitoring small craft and swimmers poses serious technological challenges. For example, distinguishing small boats and swim mers from waves is often technologically difficult. Detecting suspicious materials at a distance is per haps the most daunting technical challenge. The costs of establishing and maintaining wide-area sur veillance are especially significant.

Finally, situational awareness and threat detec tion are effective only if they are linked to respon sive investigation of suspicious activities and interdiction of threats.

Controlling Access and Interdicting Threats. This approach involves restricting access to sensi tive areas, which might include critical infrastruc ture, extremely hazardous material, national icons, high-value ships such as passenger ships or ferries, or densely populated areas.

Interdiction raises issues concerning the man power and capabilities available to control access and conduct interdiction. For example, signifi cantly enhancing community policing at sea could be extremely costly. In some cases, restricting or controlling passage is impractical or would signif icantly disrupt the movement of goods, people, and services.

The most significant technical challenge is devel oping non-lethal disabling technologies to limit the requirement for employing deadly force. Effective interoperable communications, information shar ing, and coordinating joint action among federal, state, and local authorities and the private sector remain significant concerns.

Mitigating the Threat

The maritime domain has a vast number of vul nerabilities, and terrorists have many options and opportunities for determining how, when, and where to attack maritime infrastructure. Fixating on a particular method of attack or trying to pro tect a particular target set is a self-defeating strat egy that not only imposes significant costs on the defender, but also can easily be circumvented by an adaptive enemy.

In that regard, focusing specifically on the small-boat threat is probably not the best way to address the challenge. Rather, maritime security solutions should focus on:

Ensuring resiliency. Trade accounts for one-third of the U.S. economy, and much of that trade and a significant portion of the nation's transportation and energy infrastructure depends on or is located near maritime infrastructure. The most important national objective in the maritime domain should be to ensure that commerce continues regardless of any natural or man-made disaster.
Getting the biggest bang for the buck. Security investments should be focused on initiatives that provide the most value for improving maritime security overall. Hard choices need to be made. Piecemeal investments in maritime security will add little real security. On the other hand, effective counterterrorism operations that focus broadly on identifying, investigating, and thwarting terrorist activities and plots in the maritime domain offer more value than those that focus narrowly on trying to deny terrorists access to a specific target or delivery means.
What the Government Should Do

To create the most effective public policies to keep the nation safe, free, and prosperous, Congress and the Administration must take a broad and long-term view of the small-boat threat. Any proposed efforts should:

Address economic competitiveness, not just security, with solutions that support both objectives. In particular, the Administration should not impose significant new regulatory restrictions on the operation and licensing of small boats and small-boat operators. Such mea sures will add little security at significant cost.
Insist on programs that best enhance the overall security of the maritime domain and contribute to the resiliency of maritime com merce. First and foremost, the government should ensure that maritime commerce is not adversely affected in the event of an incident. The Administration should complete, exercise, and refine the plan required by the national mar itime security strategy to address issues of busi ness continuity and reconstitution after major disruptions in maritime commerce.
Invest more heavily in Coast Guard modern ization, particularly in programs that improve situational awareness, law enforcement, and special operations capabilities. Specifically, priority funding should be given to Coast Guard initiatives that expand the capacity of the ser vice's maritime security teams, develop capabili ties for effective non-lethal interdiction of small boats, extend visibility of craft over the horizon by using unmanned aerial vehicles and other technologies, field new state-of-the-art patrol craft, and increase law enforcement investigation and intelligence means.
Ensure the right balance of roles, missions, and resources and close cooperation between U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard maritime security missions. The U.S. Navy should focus on providing intelligence support and mine-clearing expertise and capabilities, as well as sharing research and development in countering small-boat threats with the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard should lead in developing a national maritime domain awareness system, expand its capabilities to investigate and inter dict potential threats, and work with state and local governments and the private sector to share information and intelligence effectively.
Respect the principles of federalism and exploit the inherent advantages of a free-enterprise approach to providing the most creative, efficient, and effective solutions. Homeland security grants should be minimal. Instead, the federal government should facilitate the sharing of best practices and allow state and local governments and the private sector the freedom to innovate and adopt measures that are most appropriate for their needs and that would best perform the due diligence necessary to ensure business continuity and disaster recovery.

Government should also encourage and provide incentives for craft under 500 tons to employ transponder locator and identification technolo gies. These transponders perform a function sim ilar to what OnStar offers for automobiles. Adopting these technologies would enhance public safety and increase situational awareness, and use of these systems would better enable the Coast Guard and other rescue services to find craft in need of assistance. The widespread use of transponders would also assist in monitoring maritime traffic.
The Way Ahead

For the United States to develop a comprehen sive and multilayered approach to homeland secu rity, it must address the small-boat threat. While the maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats, the U.S. should develop plans to improve U.S. situational awareness rather than defend against specific threat types. Investing in measures that bolster the U.S. economy and provide the best return for the amount spent are also good approaches for formulating a protec tion plan against small boats.

In the end, guarding U.S. maritime craft and infrastructure will not only protect the resilience of the U.S. economy and international trade, but also protect a sector that serves as a source of enjoyment and work for millions of American citizens.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The author would like to thank Austin Knuppe for his assistance in putting together this paper

REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS during April 2009

In pursuance of the Maritime Safety Committee’s instruction to the Secretariat to issue monthly reports of all incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships are reported to the Organization and, in addition, to issue, on a quarterly basis, composite reports accompanied by an analysis, on a regional basis, of the situation and an indication whether the frequency of incidents is increasing or decreasing and advising of any new feature or pattern of significance,the annex hereto provides, in the tabulated format agreed by the Committee, the summary of reports on incidents received between 31 March and 30 April 2009, including a distinction
between acts of piracy and acts of armed robbery against ships (annex 1) and attempted attacks (annex 2). Further and as instructed by the Committee (MSC 75/24, paragraph 18.41), the Secretariat has, since July 2002, started classifying separately any reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea (international or territorial waters) vis-à-vis acts of armed robbery allegedly committed in port areas, as well as attempted acts of armed robbery.

The total number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships so far reported to the Organization is 4,978, an increase of 57 since 31 March 2009.

1 “Piracy” is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101)
as follows:
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”

2 “Armed robbery against ships” is defined in the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.922(22), Annex, paragraph 2.2), as follows:
“Armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board
such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.”

for the full report: International Maritime Organization

Piracy and the Rules of Engagement

Each day there seems to be new reports of piracy near the coast of Somalia. The pirates have learned over time that a hostile takeover of an unwitting crew and cargo is big business. With each successful attack, they get their prize – ransom.
In the past, smaller cargo and fishing vessels transiting isolated shipping lanes along the coast were easy targets by pirates concealed by a variety of unprotected inlets. Criminal organizations behind piracy attacks continued filling their coffers with ransom payments. As commercial shippers sought safer passage, they began transiting further from the dangerous waters known for attacks. The pirates looking for their prey now began traveling further out to sea for the hunt. By doing so, they found bigger, more lucrative vessels…and unprotected targets of opportunity.
The International Maritime Bureau reports a, “dramatic increase in attacks of piracy for the first nine months of 2008.” The heightened number of piracy incidents is attributed to instability in the region, particularly the hazardous waters of the Gulf of Aden and the East coast of Somalia. The region faces continual political disorder with no indicator that anyone in power will challenge organized crime groups attacking vessels in the region. Incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia are directly proportional to the political environment.
Some History
During the summer of 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) came to power in Somalia. Immediately afterward, the UIC announced they would punish those engaged in piracy according to Sharia law.
For a time the incidents ceased, until pirates struck the United Arab Emirates cargo ship, MV Veesham I. A small boat with six pirates boarded and took control of the cargo ship shortly after leaving port. Initially the pirates demanded a $1 million ransom; negotiations lowered the amount to $150,000. The UIC in response, set to sea in small boats, recaptured the vessel and rescued the crew after a gun battle with the pirates.
The UIC withstood the challenge to their authority. Unfortunately, the success was short-lived. One month later, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia gaining political control of the country. They pushed the UIC out of power. With the UIC gone, the organized gangs of pirates no longer feared governmental retribution for their offshore attacks. Offshore piracy assaults continued again.
Rules of Engagement
Recently, I was asked a variety of questions related to the “Rules of Engagement” for the protection of cargo vessels transiting piracy-prone areas. Discussions with a variety of law enforcement and security professionals indicated they had the same questions. Given that, here’s an attempt to clarify the options available for commercial shippers transiting the area. The answers below apply to U.S. mariners sailing under a Merchant Mariners’ Document (MMD) or USCG License.
Question: It seems that pirates have no difficulty these days jumping onto a cargo ship; can the crew shoot back at them?
Generally, that’s a bad idea. If the crew were to engage in an at-sea firefight, the pirate is more agile and difficult to hit. If a crew starts shooting, it is likely the pirates will make a choice: leave or shoot back.
As I describe in my book, “Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System” the weapon of choice for pirates are AK-47 assault rifles and Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG). If attacked by an RPG, the ship becomes vulnerable to fire and no sailor wants to face such a calamity at sea. If a ship burns, there’s nowhere to go. When combating a fire, the ship must stop otherwise the prevailing wind caused by forward motion of the vessel feeds the fire, making matters worse. The Captain generally has two choices: risk catastrophic damage to the vessel, risk crew safety and stop, or, protect the ship and stop. A minimal crew with no security protection stands little chance of successfully fighting a fire and out maneuvering a smaller, faster boat armed with weapons. The ship will always stop and the pirates know that.
Question: Is the crew allowed to carry firearms in a cargo ship?
Title 46 of United States Code applies to U.S. Merchant Mariners. There is no provision within the code allowing crew to carry firearms. In fact, mariners are subject to standing regulations defined by the Master of the vessel. Typically, prohibitions include drugs, alcohol and weapons being brought aboard the vessel. Violations can result in punitive measures, including a charge of misconduct resulting in suspension or revocation of their license or document as noted in 46 U.S. Code § 7703, “Bases for suspension or revocation. “
Additionally, the regulation pertaining to Personnel Action against mariners is included in 46 Code of Federal Regulations 5.27:
“Misconduct is human behavior which violates some formal, duly established rule. Such rules are found in, among other places, statutes, regulations, the common law, the general maritime law, a ship’s regulation or order, or shipping articles and similar sources. It is an act which is forbidden or a failure to do that which is required.”
That’s the long answer. The short answer is: No.
Question: I understand that if the pirate attack happens within territorial waters, the ship captain cannot take matters on his own hands but depends on the navy of the country guarding that coast. Is this correct?
One of the reasons that piracy is so rampant near the coast of Somalia, Nigeria and the Gulf of Aden is that there are few security resources available to protect a vessel. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) established a Maritime Security Patrol Area with the intent of discouraging attacks against vessels transit the area. There are few resources available with a large body of water. I remember many U.S. Coast Guard patrols when we were searching for survivors from a marine casualty, drug smugglers or migrant traffickers. There were times when we knew of a last location or intelligence may have provided an intended track line for smugglers. Many times, we were successful; other times not. A body of water seems very large when searching for a small boat.
In August of this year, the USS Peleliu received a distress from the Singaporean cargo ship, Gem of Kilakarai. The naval ship was outfitted with a contingent of U.S. Marine helicopters from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Marines launched two aircraft and chased the pirates away. While the Navy and Marine Corps did an excellent job, it’s important to note that the piracy attempt was only 10-miles from the ship. The favorable results came from quick notification and the close location.
Another issue deals with territorial waters. The U.S. or other allied vessels will not engage unless fired upon, or given specific permission to conduct law enforcement missions within their waters. Just as the U.S respects our own territorial boundaries, we must respect those of other nations. For those incidents occurring within territorial waters, there are many times no resources to help.
Question: What are the rules of engagement for private cargo ships?
Given that the crews of cargo ships are exempt from carrying weapons according to U.S. law, the remaining options are to use non-lethal force or hire private security. Crews can use a variety of sonic guns, water cannons, etc. These have some value but still, the pirates can often out maneuver a larger vessel and attempt to climb aboard in a place outside the range/bearing of the gun. Personally, I would consider coating a portion of the decks where a pirate would likely climb aboard with a thick, biodegradable coating of lard. Once someone slips and falls in that mess, they can be an easy target to take them down. The other option of course is to hire private security protection. Remembering the points I made earlier about RPG’s and fire at sea, private security professionals must consider specific tactical options.
When pirates attack, it impacts the global economy. Ships are detained or stolen, crews are injured and sometimes killed and cargoes are lost. With each incident, maritime shipping firms are faced with cargo losses and the payout of high ransoms. Sometimes attacks are not reported attempting to prevent maritime insurers from raising already expensive premiums. In the end, confidence of safe global shipping is in jeopardy.
Pirates making millions each year continue to buy weapons and new communications technologies to build upon their organized crime network. As these networks grow, their logistical and internal intelligence capability increases. Over time, there are more loyal to the network than those seeking to prevent attacks. The same methodology continues much like organized drug and alien smuggling operations have for years. Terrorist organizations operate the same way. According to a Washington DC-based think tank, they say there is no link between piracy and terrorism. I disagree; but that’s ok. We need to look at each problem from every direction and sometimes collaboratively seek viable options. Piracy is seriously impacting the global economy in a negative way.
Perhaps the rules of engagement should be revisited.
Anthony M. Davis is the Founder of the Homeland Security Group and Author of, "Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System."

Terrorism’s Effect on Maritime Shipping

By: Roger L. Tomberlin

In the first years of the nineteenth century, Mediterranean pirates, with the support of the Barbary States of northern Africa, would capture merchant ships, terrorize their crews, and hold the ship for ransom. In response, the United States launched the Barbary wars, the first successful effort by the young republic to protect its citizens from a ruthless, unconventional enemy by fighting a protracted struggle overseas. Today, the international community fails to realize that sea piracy still has not been eliminated. Not only has piracy never been eradicated, but the number of pirate attacks on ships off the coasts of Somalia, Nigeria, and the Malaccan straights has tripled in the past decade elevating piracy to its highest level in history. And contrary to the stereotype, intelligence has revealed that today's pirates are often trained fighters aboard speedboats equipped with satellite phones and global positioning systems and armed with automatic weapons, antitank missiles, and grenades. Many of these so called pirates have ties to their regional terrorist organizations.
Most disturbingly, the scourges of piracy and terrorism are increasingly intertwined: piracy on the high seas is becoming a key tactic of terrorist groups. Unlike the pirates of old, whose sole objective was quick commercial gain, many of today's pirates are maritime terrorists with an ideological bent and a broad political agenda. This nexus of piracy and terrorism is especially dangerous for energy markets: most of the world's oil and gas is shipped through the world's most piracy-infested waters. As the world’s need for oil, natural gas and goods swell in today’s economy, the need for intelligence concerning the pirates and their home base of operations becomes ever inerrably important. Terrorist incidents have an adverse impact on Maritime shipping throughout the world.
Download: Terrorism’s Effect on Maritime Shipping
Roger L. Tomberlin is a 20+ year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation serving within International and Domestic Terrorism programs. He is currently serving as a Program Coordinator within the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program which includes HAZMAT, railroad, airline, and marine investigations.

New Tactics in the fight against piracy

2009 has seen an increase in security issues, with an increase in the number of pirate attacks in the seas around Somalia. Although this is the most frequently reported area, there are other areas around the world such as the south eastern china seas and off the coast of India that are also targeted.

Piracy, a modern problem is not however new, bandits of the sea have targeted sea farer's since the advent of sea travel and transport. The Caribbean and the Mediterranean have long been targeted by men and groups looking to capitalize on the trade routes.

In our modern times, many security companies are coming up with fresh and innovative solutions to this century old problem. One such company RSB International uses ex Israeli special forces, specifically trained and armed to sufficiently protect crew and cargo.

Israeli personnel are specifically chosen for their experience in dealing with uncoventional scenarios as well as experience and knowledge dealing with dynamic and changing strategies, this is essential to the new battlefield, fluid and changeable.

The reporter hopes that this century old problem has found a new and successful solution to prevent piracy and there by maintaining seafaring routes and the opportunity for trade between countries to continue unhindered.

russian vessel gets hijacked

piracy in somalia

Fighting Piracy in Somalia

We applaud the U.S. Navy for the rescue of Richard Phillips from Somali pirates, and Captain Phillips for giving himself as a hostage to safeguard his crew. We also regret the death of the French yachtsman, Florent Lemaçon, who was killed along with two pirates when French navy commandos stormed the sailboat they were on (Mr. Lemaçon’s wife and child and two family friends were rescued).

The cruel fact is that even as Americans celebrated the rescue, the Somali pirates — in what is business as usual off of Somalia’s long ungoverned coast— were grabbing more ships. There are now 17 captured ships and about 260 hostages waiting to be ransomed. The short-term answer is more patrols and better cooperation with regional states; a long-term solution, alas, remains elusive.

The U.S. and French governments were fully within their rights to authorize deadly force against the heavily armed pirates. Though the bandits may only be looking for ransom, their trophies have included giant oil tankers and ships full of sophisticated weapons. They have seriously disrupted shipping in one of the busiest maritime passages in the world, and their tactics could easily be adopted by terrorist groups — including Islamist groups inside Somalia linked to Al Qaeda — looking to cripple global commerce. President Obama has rightly pledged to work with nations around the world to fight this plague. The United States and its allies and other affected states will have to increase their patrols in the Indian Ocean, as well as their coordination and cooperation. They must also consider the pros and cons of placing armed teams on cargo ships to repel pirate attacks. The pirates simply cannot be allowed to roam the seas unchallenged. But Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa, with countless small ports, fishing villages and inlets, so military means alone are not likely to end the piracy. That can happen only with the revival of a semblance of government in Somalia.

This is tough. Somalia has known only varying degrees of anarchy for 18 years now. A whole generation of Somalis has been raised in a violent free-for-all of warlords, pirates and extremists. Misguided American attempts to impose order produced the “Black Hawk Down” fiasco in 1993 and an ultimately useless Ehtiopian invasion in 2006.

Yet left to its own devices, Somalia can only become more noxious, spreading violence to its East African neighbors, breeding more extremism and making shipping through the Gulf of Aden ever more dangerous and costly. Various approaches are being discussed, such as working through Somalia’s powerful clans to reconstitute first local and then regional and national institutions. These must be urgently explored. One thing is clear: the United States cannot go it alone. This is a problem that can only be solved in partnership with Western allies and East African governments.

Pirate Attacks Up 75%; Nearly One Raid Per Day

Somewhere on the world’s waterways, a pirate will try to strike today. Another will tomorrow. And another the day after that. Piracy is on the rise, across the globe —up nearly 75%, from last decade to this one, according to a new report from theRAND Corporation. There’s now at least an attempt at a pirate attack nearly every day. 

Why?  Mainly, the RAND report says, because there are now more targets to loot. "First and most fundamentally, there has been a massive increase in commercial maritime traffic. Combined with the large number of ports around the world, this growth has provided pirates with an almost limitless range of tempting, high-payoff targets."

And while some governments (and some reporters) have worries about pirates and terrorists teaming up, "the presumed convergence between maritime terrorism and piracy remains highly questionable, however. To date, there has been no credible evidence to support speculation about such a nexus emerging."

 

There were "a total of 2,463 actual or attempted acts of piracy were registered around the world between 2000 and the end of 2006. This represents an annual average incident rate of 352, a substantial increase over the mean of 209 recorded for the period of 1994–1999," the report notes. "The concentration of pirate attacks continues to be greatest in Southeast Asia, especially in the waters around the Indonesian archipelago… which accounted for roughly 25 percent of all global incidents during 2006."

The post-9/11 environment has also made some shipping lanes more vulnerable.  Since then, governments have been pressured to "to invest in expensive, land-based homeland security initiatives" — often ignoring maritime security, as a result. In addition:

…lax coastal and port-side security have played an important role in enabling low-level piratical activity, especially harbor thefts of goods from ships at anchor.

…corruption and emergent voids of judicial prerogative have encouraged official complicity in high-level pirate rings, which has impacted directly on the “phantom ship” phenomenon.

…the global proliferation of small arms has provided pirates (as well as terrorists and other criminal elements) with an enhanced means to operate on a more destructive and sophisticated level.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden

There have been more than 70 acts of piracy or attempted piracy against yachts and cargo ships in Gulf of Aden this year
(Badri Media/EPA)

Jenny Booth
Nov 17: A Saudi-owned supertanker loaded with crude oil, with two Britons among its 25 crew, is boarded off the Kenyan coast - the largest ship to be seized so far by Somali pirates, and the farthest away from Somali territorial waters

Nov 12: A Turkish chemical tanker hijacked off the coast of Yemen

Nov 11: Three pirates killed and others captured in firefight with Royal Marines from HMS Cumberland, after attempted hijack of Danish-registered MV Powerful 60 miles off Yemen coast

Oct 28: A Spanish military patrol plane thwarts attempts to hijack an oil tanker by buzzing the pirate vessel repeatedly and dropping smoke canisters

Related Links
Pictures: Somali pirates
Pirates made mistake in capturing tanks
Royal Navy in firefight with Somali pirates
Oct 2: Ten EU countries pledge to contribute ships, helicopters and personnel to an anti-piracy taskforce off east Africa

Sept 26: Greek chemical tanker seized off the coast of Somalia

Sept 25: Pirates demand $35 million ransom after seizing the Ukrainian cargo ship Faina, which was laden with Russian tanks, and its crew

Sept 18: Insurance premiums for ships using the Gulf of Aden are reported to have increased tenfold in one year, on the same day that pirates seize a Greek ship carrying salt, with 25 Filipino crew, and a Hong Kong-registered vessel en route for Tunisia with 24 Chinese and one Sri Lankan crew aboard

Sept 5: Somali gunmen demand $1 million ransom for a retired French couple aboard a yacht that was seized in the Gulf of Aden and sailed to a remote buccaneer hideout. The couple are rescued on Sept 16 when the yacht is stormed by an underwater combat unit of French special forces

Aug 22: Somali pirates seize three ships in one day. An Iranian bulk carrier with 29 crew and a Japanese-operated chemical tanker with 19 hands aboard are hijacked within an hour of one another on the Gulf of Aden, followed a few hours later by a German-operated cargo ship with nine crew

Aug 20: A Malaysian palm oil tanker is seized

Aug 14: Thai cargo ship and the 28 people on board taken hostage off Northern Somalia

July: A Japanese-owned ship carrying 20 Philippine sailors is hijacked in the Gulf of Aden

June: UN Security Council votes to allow countries to send warships into Somali waters to tackle piracy

April 21: Pirates fire rocket-propelled grenades at a Japanese oil tanker, leaving a hole that allowed several hundred gallons of fuel to leak out

April 11: In a daring helicopter raid, French marine commandos free the 30 crew of the luxury yacht Le Ponant a week after it was seized by pirates described as local Somali fishermen.

Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings

Mariners are warned to be extra cautious and to take necessary precautionary measures when transiting the following areas:

South East Asia and Indian Sub Continent

Bangladesh:
Although the number of attacks has fallen, the area is still listed as very high risk. Pirates are targeting ships preparing to anchor. Most attacks reported at Chittagong anchorages and approaches.

Indonesia:
Anambas / Natuna island area, Belawan, Jakarta/Tg. Priok. Pirates normally armed with guns / knives / machete. Generally be vigilant in other areas. Many attacks may have gone unreported.

Malacca Straits:
Although the number of attacks have dropped due to the increase and aggressive patrols by the littoral states Authorities since July 2005, ships are advised to continue maintaining a strict anti piracy watch when transiting the straits. Currently, there are no indications for how long the patrols will continue.

Malaysia:
off Tioman Island / South China Sea

Philippines:
Manila – Pirates target ships at anchor and surrounding waters.

Singapore Straits:
Vessels are advised to continue to be vigilant and maintain anti piracy watches. Pirates attack ships while underway or while anchored at OPL.

Vietnam:
Vung Tau

Africa and Gulf of Aden

Africa:

Tema (Ghana):
Most attacks occurred while ship at anchor.

Lagos & Bonny River (Nigeria):
Pirates are violent and have attacked and robbed vessels / kidnapped crews along the coast and rivers, anchorages ports and surrounding waters. Vessels advised to be also vigilant in other parts in Nigeria.

Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania):
Pirates continue to target ships in port, anchorages and surrounding waters.

Gulf of Aden:
Somali pirates are attacking vessels in the northern Somali coast in the Gulf of Aden. These pirates are firing automatic weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) in an attempt to board and hijack vessels. Once the attack is successful and the vessel hijacked, the pirates sail the vessel to the Somali coast and thereafter demand a ransom for the safe release of the vessel and crew. All vessels transiting the area are advised to take additional precautionary measures and maintain strict 24 hours visual and radar anti piracy watch using all available means. Watch keeping crews should look out for small suspicious boats converging to own vessel. Early sightings/detection and accurate assessment will allow Master to increase speed and take evasive manoeuvres to escape from pirates and at the same time request for assistance from various Authorities/Agencies including the IMB PRC.

Since 1 February 2009, MSCHOA (www.mschoa.org) has established the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC). Military assets (Naval and Air) will be strategically deployed within the area to best provide protection and support to merchant ships.

Masters using the IRTC are not relieved of their obligation and should continue to maintain a strict 24 hour lookout using all available means to get an early warning of an approaching threat. Some vessels have been attacked/hijacked in the corridor.

Ships/Owners are advised to register their details on the MSCHOA website www.mschoa.org and obtain further information regarding the close support protection details for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. Ships are encouraged to conduct their passage through the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) in groups based on their transit speed.

Group Transits
From 0001Z Sun 01 Feb a new Group Transit programme will be brought into force.
This will have Group Transits for vessels proceeding at the following speeds: 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 kts.

Master are also advise to maintain a listening watch on VHF Channels 16 and 72 in order to hear the Maritime Advisory Calls from the warships in the area who will make general security broadcasts to announce their location and in turn will also listen for merchant ships calling them.

Somalia:
Recent attacks indicate that the pirates have resumed attacking vessels in the eastern and southern coast of Somalia. Some attacks have spread and taken place as far as off the Kenyan and Tanzanian coast. The Somali pirates are dangerous and are prepared to fire their automatic weapons and RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) at ships in order to stop them. Pirates are believed to be using “mother vessels” to launch attacks further away from the coast. These “mother vessels” are able to proceed far out to sea and launch smaller boats to attack and hijack passing ships. Some of these attacks have taken place almost 500nm from the coast. The IMB in cooperation with the MSCHOA advices that vessels not making scheduled calls to ports in Somalia should keep as far away as possible from the Somali coast, preferably more than 600 nautical miles from the coast line and when routing north / south consider keeping east of 60E longitude until east of Seychelles.

Mariners are advised to report any suspicious boats to the Centre. A 24hour visual and radar watch must be maintained as early sightings / detection and accurate assessment will allow Masters to take evasive actions and increase speed and at the same time request for assistance and escape.

South and Central America and the Carribbean waters

Brazil:
Although the number of reported attacks has dropped in Santos. Ships are advised to continue to be vigilant.

Rest of the world

Arabian Sea
Sightings and calls from suspicious small boats. In some cases, boatschased ships with unknown intent.

Israeli teams are becoming the anti-pirate heroes of the world

Pirates attacked the Italian cruise ship Melody, carrying more than 1,500 passengers and crew, 1,000 kilometers off Somalia last Saturday, but were repelled by Israeli security guards on board. The security guards fired over the pirates' heads, forcing them to retreat.

This was the first time that a ship's crew fought back after being attacked in the pirate-infested waters between Somalia and the Seychelles, rather than giving in to the robbers. In the unclarity surrounding the incident, more than one party tried to claim the success, and one unconfirmed report said that Israeli "commando units" were involved in the incident.

The truth, as usual, was far less heroic. The "heroes" were members of the ship's Israeli security team, employed by Mano International Security, an Israeli company specializing in maritime security services.

Company owner Mano Nik (Nikfahama) returned from Italy yesterday, where he participated in a preliminary investigation of the incident. "The guys acted exactly according to the regulations and I'm proud of them," Nik told Haaretz on Thursday.

He refused to give more details, however. "The company has been working for 22 years covertly, and has no interest in exposure," he said.

Six pirates in a boat reportedly approached the Melody at night and opened fire, throwing ladders onto the ship's hull with the intention of hijacking it. But the Israeli security guards fired back and after a 10-minute gunfire exchange drove the marauders off.

The ship's captain, Ciro Pinto, said the guards fired in the air to drive off the pirates, but a member of one of the pirate gangs operating in the area was cited saying that one pirate had been hit. "It was the first time we have encountered resistance," the Somali bandit was quoted as saying.

After the attack the Melody continued its cruise accompanied by a Spanish warship. It may dock at Aqaba port tomorrow on its way to the ship's home base in Genoa in northern Italy. A Spanish fleet ship this week reportedly intercepted the boat carrying the pirates suspected of attacking the Melody, but this has not been verified.

According to some sources, Mano Nik served as a major in the Israel Air Force, where he dealt with air security. After his release he began his civilian career as a ship's security guard, eventually becoming the owner of an international company registered in Europe. The Petah Tikva-based company's Web site says its clients include MSC Cruises, the Italian company that owns the Melody cruise ship. A picture of the Melody appears on the Web site.

The security guards who saved the Melody, like those on many passenger ships worldwide, are mostly young Israelis after their military service, for whom this is a well-paid temporary job. Many of them are not former navy men, and certainly not naval commandos. "The job requirements include combatant military service but it doesn't matter what kind," a source who worked in the field and wishes to remain anonymous told Haaretz.

The Israeli security guards' tasks on cruise ships are varied. They must protect the ship from pirates or terrorists, but also act as security officers against thieves and keep the order, especially if there is a casino on board.

Mano security guards won praise already 15 years ago after extracting passengers of the Italian ship Achille Lauro, which was hijacked in 1985 by Palestinian terrorists and set alight.

Due to the complexity of international law, ship security guards do not always carry weapons. Sometimes the weapons are kept in the captain's safe until it is necessary to take them out. The quantities and types of weapons are determined by the company's policy and the risks facing the ship. Nobody wants to speak about the legal aspects. The most dangerous shipping lanes for piracy are in West Africa off Nigeria, the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia, and the seas off the Somali-Yemeni coasts. Mano International Security's clients include Greek and Italian cruise companies. Israeli security guards and experts are in high demand in maritime security due to their experience, reputation and military training. Large shipping companies like Royal Caribbean, in which the Ofer brothers are partners, or the Arison family's Carnival Cruise Line and the Italian Costa Cruises have their own security departments.

However, they employ many Israelis as security guards, especially as team leaders. Other Israeli companies specializing in maritime security include Eli Leffler's Hashita and former Navy commander Micha Ram's Spike. International awareness of the importance of maritime security increased in the past year after pirates hijacked some 400 boats, ships and yachts, says Leffler.